



U.S. ARMY INFORMATION PROPONENT OFFICE

INSTRUCTOR'S GUIDE TO INFORM AND INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES

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Commanders must build teams – Joint and interagency partners – and they must be able to understand complex environments and information [that is available] to influence friends and adversaries.

LTG Robert L. Caslen, Jr.

**From the Director
Information Proponent Office (IPO)**

The doctrinal terms on the opposing page are often misunderstood, confused or misapplied, especially as they relate to full spectrum operations and Mission Command. As a result, they receive inadequate, incorrect or inconsistent instruction within the Army's Professional Military Education system. The purpose of this Instructor's Guide is to assist instructors across all subject areas – be it combat operations, logistics or military history – in applying information-related doctrine and terminology more confidently and consistently, while enhancing their students' ability to integrate and employ information-related capabilities smartly, effectively and synergistically. This guide will also assist unit leaders conduct professional development and unit training more effectively, and serve as a self-study guide for any Soldier desiring to know more about Inform and Influence Activities (IIA).

This guide will begin with an overview of key foundational references and a detailed study of the doctrinal definition of IIA. It will then offer a series of questions and answers designed to enhance understanding of information-related doctrinal concepts and terminology that affect the planning, coordination, execution and assessment of IIA and related capabilities. Next, the guide will offer a number of ideas on how best to integrate IIA into programs of instruction, as well as possible questions that instructors might incorporate into their classes to spur discussion. Finally, it will provide a brief overview of additional educational/training opportunities available to the Force to learn about IIA.

On the back page is contact information and links to additional resources. The IPO stands ready to assist instructors, leaders and Soldiers in their quest to learn and master the fundamentals of IIA. Please don't hesitate to contact us.



Michael J. Dominique
COL, IN
Director, IPO



REFERENCES: A Short List

- SECDEF Memorandum, Subject: Strategic Communication and Information Operations in the DoD, dated Jan 25, 2011
- DoD Directive 3600.01, Subject: Information Operations (IO), dated August 14, 2006, Incorporating Change 1, May 23, 2011
- Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, *Information Operations*, 13 February 2006
- Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*, February 2008, with Change 1, 22 February 2011
- FM 3-13, *Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, November 2003 (undergoing revision)
- FM 5-0, *The Operations Process*, March 2010
- FM 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*, August 2003 (undergoing revision)
- FM 3-05.30, *Psychological Operations*, April 2005 (undergoing revision) & FM 3-05.301 *Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques and Procedures*, August 2007.
- FM 46-1, *Public Affairs Operations*, 30 May 1997
- FM 3-55.12 *COMCAM: Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, Procedures for Combat Camera Operations*, May 2007

IIA Definition

Inform and Influence Activities is the integration of designated information-related capabilities in order to synchronize themes, messages and actions with operations to inform U.S. and global audiences, influence foreign audiences and affect adversary and enemy decision-making.

Integration of information-related capabilities. All assets and capabilities at a commander's disposal have the capacity to inform and influence to varying effects and degrees. Certain of these assets, here termed "designated information-related capabilities," are information-centric in mission and purpose and are designed, trained and resourced to inform or influence. The designated information-related capabilities within the IIA construct consist of public affairs (PA), military information support operations (MISO), combat camera (COMCAM) and Soldier/leader engagement (S/LE). Commanders and staffs, however, are not limited to these "core" capabilities when planning operations. IIA recognizes that success depends on effectively employing ALL assets in order to shape the information environment, so that themes, messages and actions are synchronized with each other and with operations. In addition to the information-related capabilities of PA, MISO, COMCAM and S/LE, the commander can designate a range of other capabilities such as civil affairs, cyber electromagnetic activities (CEMA), operations security (OPSEC), military deception (MILDEC) and others, to achieve mission objectives.

Synchronize themes, messages and actions with operations. Through execution of their mission command task to lead IIA, commanders decide how they want to inform or influence the information environment in their area of operations (AO). IIA focuses commanders on synchronizing themes, messages and actions with operations in order to inform or influence the audiences within their AO in support of operational goals by portraying a unified message between words and actions and avoiding information fratricide. The synchronization of themes, messages and actions is achieved through the operations process. The more refined this integration and synchronization process, the more operational success units will achieve through shared understanding and purpose across all audiences. This means not only marginalizing or defeating adversarial or enemy messaging efforts, but also promoting and shaping the perceptions, attitudes, beliefs and behaviors of those audiences that exist within the AO, as well as wider audiences.

Information is the oxygen of the modern age. It seeps through the walls topped by barbed wire; it wafts across the electrified borders.

President Ronald Reagan

To inform. The commander has a statutory responsibility to inform the U.S. public on operations within the AO to the fullest extent possible. The responsibility to inform is balanced with the responsibility to protect operations through OPSEC. Operational success may depend on informing audiences outside the U.S. IIA provides the means to synchronize informing capabilities across the information environment.

To influence. Influence is limited to foreign audiences. Commanders may wish to shape, sway or alter foreign audience perceptions in order to gain an operational advantage. This influence may be intended to sway audiences to support Army operations or to cause those audiences to stop supporting adversary or enemy operations. IIA assists the commander in integrating the various means of influence at their disposal.

To affect adversary and enemy decisionmaking. Ultimate victory requires adversarial and enemy decisionmakers — from individual Soldier to enemy general or supreme leader — to capitulate to our demands. IIA provides the means to affect adversary and enemy decisionmaking processes. It may affect those processes through actions intended to create doubt at the individual level all the way up to activities meant to deny an adversary's or enemy's ability to make timely and effective decisions.



Questions and Answers

What is IIA?

According to FM 3-0, Change 1, Feb 2011, Inform and Influence Activities is defined as *the integrating activities within the mission command war-fighting function that ensure themes and messages designed to inform domestic audiences and influence foreign friendly, neutral, adversary and enemy populations are synchronized with actions to support full spectrum operations. IIA incorporates components and enablers expanding the commander's ability to use other resources to inform and influence.*

With the next change to FM 3-0, the preceding definition of IIA will be revised and streamlined to that found on pages 4 and 5 of this guide.

Put another way, IIA, although seemingly plural, is a singular activity, integrative in nature, that seeks to synchronize all information-related capabilities at a commander's disposal in order to produce desired effects leading to decisive victory. Although IIA might include lethal actions and activities, it comprises largely non-lethal efforts.

Why IIA?

A decade of conflict, much of it low-intensity and counterinsurgency, has forced us to recognize that the "ideal" battlefield, if ever there was one, no longer exists. Our forces must be adept at shaping outcomes amidst uncertainty and rapid change over protracted periods of time.

The challenges we face are political and social in nature and complicated by an ever more interconnected world; thus, military solutions alone are insufficient to solve them. We are oriented less on destruction and more on the creation of conditions that enable stability, prosperity, equity and, ultimately, lasting peace. At the same time, we increasingly face multi-arrayed and multi-dimensional threats, non-hierarchical and decentralized in their decision-making, which coexist in and among a variety of populations and audiences that must be addressed uniquely and collectively, in both subtle and non-subtle ways, employing a full range of assets, mediums, signals and signs, all aimed at informing and influencing audiences to reinforce intended consequences and mitigate unintended ones.

As we've revised our thinking about the nature of the operational environ-



ment and the nature of command within complex environments, we've also revised our conceptions about how best to manage and integrate the informational aspects of our total effort. This evolution in thinking led to IIA.

How does IIA differ from Information Operations (IO)?

First, let's review the definition of IO, as defined at the DoD and Joint level. IO is *the integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operations to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decisionmaking of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own.*

Comparing this definition to the one for IIA, the following points of commonality and divergence become apparent:

- IO and IIA are both defined as integrative in nature. It's less about individual capabilities and more about their synergistic integration that fosters success.
- They both integrate information-related capabilities (more about this below).
- They both complement operations or lines of operation. However, IIA more explicitly recognizes that successful operations require the effects of information-related capabilities, many of them word- or image-based, be harmonized with actions.
- IO is adversary-focused, while IIA is concerned with informing and influencing all relevant audiences — friendly, neutral and adversarial — as well as the entire information environment.

What are information-related capabilities?

Within the Joint IO construct, information-related capabilities have traditionally been categorized as core, supporting and related, as outlined below:

- Core
 - ⇒ Electronic warfare (EW)
 - ⇒ Computer network operations (CNO)
 - ⇒ Military information support operations (MISO)
 - ⇒ Military deception (MILDEC)
 - ⇒ Operations security (OPSEC)
- Supporting
 - ⇒ Information assurance (IA)
 - ⇒ Physical security
 - ⇒ Physical attack
 - ⇒ Counterintelligence
 - ⇒ Combat camera (COMCAM)

- Related
 - ⇒ Public affairs (PA)
 - ⇒ Defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD)
 - ⇒ Civil affairs (CA)

The IIA construct focuses primarily on integrating the effects of the following four information-related and information-centric capabilities, complemented by other enabling capabilities, designated by the commander:

- MISO
- PA
- Soldier/leader engagement (S/LE)
- COMCAM

These capabilities can be enhanced or amplified by a range of other capabilities, designated by the commander depending on the mission and the desired end state. Among the more common complementary capabilities are: MILDEC, OPSEC, CA and cyber electromagnetic activities (CEMA).

Simply put, all military capabilities serve to make an impression of some sort on and in the minds of those against whom they are applied. As such, all military capabilities are information-related, though some are more overtly or directly so. Successful commanders recognize this fact and employ all capabilities in sophisticated and nuanced combination to build support among allies; keep neutrals neutral or attract them to our side; and convince adversaries that defeat is inevitable.

What happened to IE?

The term Information Engagement (IE) is no longer a doctrinally-accepted term.

IE was part of the Five Information Tasks construct delineated in the Feb 2008 edition of FM 3-0, which sought to align information-related capabilities under the staff section deemed most appropriate for managing that capability's employment. Perhaps because achieving cognitive effects was so challenging, the belief at the time was that the G/S-7 needed to focus on a narrow range of capabilities that served to inform and influence primarily domestic and foreign friendly and neutral audiences. The downside to the IE construct was that it fragmented a commander's ability to employ any and all capabilities to achieve information-related effects across all audiences and actors — including enemy and adversarial — that impinged on success.

While the term IE is no longer in the lexicon, engagement remains a relevant term, especially as it pertains to S/LE. The term engagement recognizes that resolution of our most challenging or intractable problems must be managed through direct human interaction, dialog and relationships.

How does Strategic Communication fit into the mix?

The DoD Dictionary of Terms defines Strategic Communication (SC) as *focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.*

The National Framework for Strategic Communication, dated March 2010, states that SC is *the synchronization of words and deeds and how they will be perceived by selected audiences, as well as programs and activities deliberately aimed at communicating and engaging with intended audiences, including those implemented by public affairs, public diplomacy, and information operations professionals.*

SC, IO and IIA are overlapping in nature. The DoD does not engage in public diplomacy directly, but supports the SC effort by ensuring its objectives are synchronized and complementary. At the strategic and theater level, Joint IO supports SC. In turn, at the operational and tactical levels, IIA supports Joint IO, ensuring themes, messages and actions are nested and integrated across all lines of operation.



Obviously, even at the lowest tactical level, the synchronization of words and deeds must support higher level themes and messages, nesting all the way up to the national level. An example of when they don't nest effectively is when the President of the U.S. is compelled to apologize for tactical actions that offend local cultural or religious mores, customs or practices.

How does IIA relate to MISO and PA?

IIA is an integrating staff function. It owns no capabilities or systems, nor does it man a functionally unique Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) that perform IIA. *[There are functionally unique organizations, such as 1st IO Command and the Reserve Component Theater Information Operations Groups (TIOGs) that fulfill Joint IO missions.]* The Information Proponent Office, which is the Army's proponent for IIA (FA 30), has doctrinal oversight of Soldier/leader engagement (S/LE), but MISO and PA also contribute to supporting a commander's overall engagement strategy.

In contrast, both MISO and PA own functionally specific capabilities, systems and organizations. Both have specific doctrinal responsibilities for which they remain responsible. PA, in particular, has Federal statutes within which it must operate.

IIA's task is to ensure that the efforts, activities, products and messages produced and disseminated by these capabilities are integrated and synchronized in such a way that they complement, reinforce and amplify the other and achieve the commander's desired end state. Most often, this integration is achieved through the IIA Working Group, in combination with the daily planning and coordinating activities of the IIA Cell.

How is Soldier/Leader Engagement different from Key Leader Engagement?

Soldier/leader engagement (S/LE) is defined as personal interactions by Soldiers and leaders with audiences in the AO that are designed to inform and influence. S/LE is not a single, discrete event but rather a comprehensive strategy that recognizes that achieving cognitive effects through human interactions requires time and repetition.

S/LEs can be deliberate (planned) or dynamic (unplanned or unanticipated) and run the gamut from a chance encounter with a shepherd in the field to a fully orchestrated negotiation between a commander and a government leader. The latter has traditionally been termed a key leader engagement (KLE), as it involves a prominent leader from either or both sides.

The term KLE is, however, problematic. What or who constitutes "key" depends on the vantage point of the person applying the term. Adopting the term S/LE emphasizes the importance of leader interactions with audiences throughout the operational environment while simultaneously acknowledging the effects of Soldier interactions on these same audiences.



Who is responsible for IIA?

Commanders, first and foremost, are responsible for IIA, assisted by their staffs, particularly the G/S-7. At battalion and below, an officer or NCO, preferably one with a P4 Additional Skill Identifier (ASI), is typically assigned responsibility for integrating information-related capabilities.

The P4 ASI is awarded to individuals completing the Tactical IO Course, which currently is offered at Fort Sill, OK, and through the 3rd Battalion (IO), 124th Regiment (RTI), Vermont ARNG. Ideally, individuals who are assigned responsibility for IIA will be afforded the opportunity to attend this course. The TIOC is currently undergoing revision from a two-week resident course into a two-phased blended-learning course that mixes distance learning with a one-week residency component.

In terms of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF), the Commander, Combined Arms Center

(CAC), is the Army's proponent for IIA. Day-to-day responsibility falls to the Information Proponent Office (IPO) Director, an O-6 billet. The IPO is a part of the Mission Command Center of Excellence and the Capabilities Development Integration Directorate, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

I can see where IIA contributes to stability operations but how does it relate to offensive and defensive combat operations?

Full spectrum operations recognize that operations continually move along the continuum between peace and war. Often within a specific named campaign (OIF, OEF as two examples), multiple types of operations happen concurrently. Ultimate success depends on breaking the will of the enemy or adversary, while simultaneously cultivating the support of allies. Sometimes only lethal force will cause the enemy to capitulate, but in an increasingly complex, interconnected and asymmetric world, more subtle forms of leverage and influence are needed.

Put another way, when force-on-force operations are necessary, then this destructive force is a means of influence, to the extreme. At the same time, combat operations will always be complemented, supported or reinforced by PA, MISO, COMCAM and S/LE activities. The appropriate blend of lethal vs. non-lethal, subtle vs. non-subtle, physical vs. mental will be situation-dependent and is one of the main challenges confronting commanders and staffs as they plan and execute their total operation.

How is IIA accomplished at levels below brigade?

Like other functional specialties with small force structures, FA 30 is only resourced to man positions at brigade and higher. This requires commanders at battalion and below to assign responsibility for integrating information-related capabilities to an officer or NCO as an additional duty. Sometimes, the Fire Support Officer is given this responsibility. At other times, the Tactical MISO Team leader is given the task. Preferably, as indicated in the answer to the question *Who is Responsible for IIA*, an officer or NCO with the P4 ASI will be assigned this task. The bottom line is that the person chosen should demonstrate sophisticated understanding of how IIA contributes to the tactical mission.

What do the terms “components” and “enablers” mean? Is one more important than the other?

These terms appear in the current definition of IIA in Change 1 to FM 3-0 (Feb 2011). As mentioned in the answer to the first question, the definition will be streamlined in the next version of FM 3-0 and speak in terms of information-related capabilities broadly, rather than employing the terms components and enablers. Still, the IIA paradigm sees the following four capabilities as inherently information-related and information-centric: MISO, PA, COMCAM and S/LE. These four capabilities are word and image-based and have as their central purpose to inform and influence.

IIA recognizes that success depends on effectively employing ALL as-

sets in order to shape the information environment, so that themes, messages and actions are synchronized with each other and with operations. In addition to the information-related capabilities of PA, MISO, COMCAM and S/LE, the commander can designate a range of other capabilities — even those not inherently or solely designed to inform or influence — to achieve mission objectives. These capabilities include CA, CEMA, OPSEC, MILDEC and others.

How does IIA relate to Cyber Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA)?

Under the Mission Command construct articulated in FM 3-0, Change 1 and FM 6-0, commanders are responsible for IIA and CEMA. Both ultimately seek to affect enemy or adversary decisionmaking, while protecting our own information-related capabilities, systems and processes. Although not an absolute distinction, IIA focuses more on those capabilities that employ words, images and direct human contact in order to affect attitudes, opinions and behaviors while CEMA focuses more on those capabilities that transmit, process, store and retrieve informational data (bits and bytes) in order to assure its integrity for friendly decisionmakers or disrupt/corrupt it against enemy decisionmakers.

Although interrelated, each requires a different skill set to perform it effectively. IIA relies more on those skills associated with the social sciences, while CEMA relies more on skills associated with engineering and computer sciences. However, both ultimately contribute to affecting human cognition. In this regard, CEMA is viewed as an enabling capability of IIA.

Considerations for Successfully Integrating IIA into Programs of Instruction

Educating IIA requires a conscious effort to broaden the discussion beyond traditional topics and mindsets. The PME often seems stuck in preparing graduates for offensive and defensive lethal operations, despite 10 years of counterinsurgency. While it's important not to let traditional war-fighting skills atrophy, instructors must facilitate more nuanced discussions that recognize the power of IIA and CEMA in achieving victory.

Most PME programs of instruction will include a dedicated block on IIA; however, developing Soldiers and leaders who are able to employ IIA with sophistication and confidence depends on threading it throughout all relevant instructional blocks. Here are some of the more obvious topics in which IIA discussion should be actively encouraged and possible questions to spur and shape this discussion:

- ***Mission Command.*** An essential MC task is leading IIA, including the development of themes and messages and serving as the unit's lead

engager. In fact, the critical and essential relevance of IIA to command is one of the driving reasons Command and Control evolved into MC.

- ⇒ Why is IIA an essential component of MC?
- ⇒ What is commander's role regarding IIA and how might commanders employ IIA to achieve their intent?
- ⇒ What should the commander's expectations be of their G/S-7 or IIA officer/NCO?

- **Leadership.** One of the most enduring conceptions of leadership is that it's fundamentally about influence — one cannot lead effectively if one cannot influence effectively. It might be argued that influence is the single-most critical skill that leaders must cultivate within themselves and others; but influence is a laden term, often viewed negatively and must be approached thoughtfully, deliberately and carefully.
 - ⇒ What is the relationship between leadership and influence?
 - ⇒ Is there a difference between the nature of influence used to lead one's unit and influence used to affect foreign audiences?
 - ⇒ How does communication factor into leadership and influence?
- **Commander's Intent.** The commander's intent envisions a future state. Because we are a land force that will invariably operate and fight in and among people, we must always be cognizant of civil considerations; it will be through civil and cultural terrain that victory is ultimately achieved. The commander's intent must acknowledge and incorporate civil considerations and recognize that changed attitudes, perceptions and behaviors are essential to realizing the envisioned future state, whether it involves breaking the enemy's will or fostering wider and more enduring support among other audiences — from the U.S. domestic audience to indigenous people in the AO.
 - ⇒ What purpose does the commander's intent serve?
 - ⇒ How might the term narrative inform commanders' approach to operations and assist them to heighten the effects of operations in order to achieve their intent?
 - ⇒ What are civil considerations and why are they important?
 - ⇒ Is it possible to achieve objectives in the cognitive realm just as one achieves objectives in the physical realm? If so, why is this important?
- **Military Decisionmaking Process: MDMP.** Planning considerations must include an understanding of the informational aspects of the operational environment and how they will affect mission execution and accomplishment.
 - ⇒ What are the adversary's or enemy's information capabilities and how do these capabilities facilitate his decisionmaking and/or impair ours?

- ⇒ What is the information landscape of the area of operations like? What means of mass communication exist? How do various relevant audiences acquire information?
- ⇒ What are the informational implications of a particular course of action? What messages will our actions and activities have on various audiences and how might the adversary exploit them?
- **Full Spectrum Operations: FSO.** IIA is an essential component of the entire range of military operations, though its percentage contribution fluctuates depending on the type of operation ongoing at any given time.
 - ⇒ How will IIA contribute to offensive operations? Conversely, what messages will offensive, lethal operations communicate and how do we shape these messages appropriately?
 - ⇒ How will IIA contribute to defensive operations? Conversely, what messages will defensive operations communicate and how do we shape these messages appropriately?
 - ⇒ How will IIA contribute to stability operations? Conversely, what messages will stability operations communicate and how do we shape these messages appropriately?



Where to Learn More

Tactical Information Operations Course

The TIOC is currently offered in residence and via mobile training teams (MTT) from two locations: Fort Sill, OK, and Northfield, VT. The Fires Center of Excellence provides a three-week course, primarily to active-duty Soldiers and units, but also available to all components and services. The

3-124th IO Battalion, Vermont Army National Guard provides a two-week course to all components, preceded by a distance learning course. Completion of either course leads to the award of the P4 Additional Skill Identifier (ASI).

The TIOC is undergoing revision to align it with evolved doctrine and will consist of two phases: an enhanced distance learning phase and a one-week resident or MTT phase, both taught through the VTARNG. The title of the new course has not been finalized but will likely be referred to as the IIA Course or Tactical IIA Course.

The TIOC is available to non-commissioned officers, rank E-6 and above, and officers of all ranks seeking to enhance their knowledge of IO/IIA and serve in billets requiring this additional skill set. Registration for the TIOC is accomplished through the Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS).



Functional Area (FA) 30 Qualification Course

The Functional Area 30 (Information) Qualification Course is the Army's lone credentialing Professional Military Education (PME) course designed to prepare FA 30s for service as Army Inform and Influence Activities (IIA) staff officers (S/G-7) at Brigade through Division. Secondly, the course prepares graduates to serve in Joint Information Operations (IO) billets.

The resident course is 12 weeks long and runs twice per calendar year (Feb-May and Sep-Dec) and has a seat capacity of 36 students per course. Officers interested in becoming FA 30s should confer with their branch managers or the IPO Personnel Branch Chief at (913) 684-9432/9438.

A companion Reserve Component (RC) course is also available. The RC course blends distance learning with platform instruction over a period of approximately eight months, two-plus weeks of which are combined with the resident course. It has a seat capacity of 36 open to both RC and active duty officers. Typically, class sizes average 18-22 students.

Information Proponent Office Websites

On the back cover are the main Web addresses for the IPO. The Proponent's AKO site, in particular, has a channel designed to complement this booklet. Here, instructors, leaders and Soldiers will find additional information, readings, links, PowerPoint slides and ongoing updates designed to enhance the education and training of IIA.



U.S. ARMY INFORMATION PROPONENT OFFICE

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

On the World Wide Web:

<http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/IPO/>

Army Knowledge Online

For AKO users, sign in and type Information Proponent Office into the Search bar. Look for the [IPO—\(Information Proponent Office\)](#) link and click on it.

On this site, you will find a channel titled “IIA Instructors Guide.” In it will be links, readings, PowerPoint slides and additional resources designed to enhance the instruction of IIA.

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We invite feedback on this booklet and ways to make it better.